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Don Herzog
Another Tocqueville
Time for a true confession: I’m skeptical of predictions in
social and political life. Talk of causal generalizations and
Hempel’s covering laws strikes me as science fiction and
fantasy in drag; talk of the unfolding of the immanent
logic of modernity makes me dyspeptic. I usually think
that structural considerations are context, not cause, and
that weird combinations of stray contingencies explain
what happens. Worse, now I’m called on to predict how
political theorists will be discussing democracy ten years
hence. Images of herding cats and Brownian motion come
to mind. Nonetheless, duty calls. I dust off my crystal ball
and discover it has three channels.
We tune in first to BLEAK REALISM. As the fog clears, we
glimpse a gathering of extremely cool people dressed in all
black. They are discussing equality, hegemony, discourse,
alterity, domination, preliminary steps toward the possi-
bility of articulating the possibility of an emancipatory
politics, and more laborious bits of jargon I can’t quite
make out. The conversation is liberally peppered with new
forms of exotic leftism, preferably with Continental con-
ceptual lineages and surnames, though oldies and goodies
(Lukacs, Habermas, Foucault, Zizek, Agamben) still get
their share of fond and uncertainly ironic airtime. (Come
on, I can’t be called on to predict the names of yet-
unheard-of theorists.) Peering over my shoulder, you’re
baffled by what seems like a conceptual shell game, with
too many abstractions chasing too few particulars. Still,
many of the participants really are exceedingly intelligent,
and if you could burst in to complain that you can’t make
out quite what it is they want to say, they would remind
you that it’s not as though the rest of political science does
without repellent jargon. They invite you to join their
merry band: with some years of sustained reading and
study, you too could talk this way. But I predict you’ll
politely decline—and then my crystal ball goes blank.
Not to worry: a new channel bursts into focus. At BRAVE
NEW WORLD, bespectacled young men with facial hair—
somehow women seem in very short supply here—are
huddled over computers. Dust-covered busts of Kenneth
Arrow and William Riker are leaning over, atop an old file
cabinet strewn with economics journals. This time the
transmission is good enough that I can make contact with
the ghostly denizens of the future. “Modeling?” I ask. I get
a snippy yes; then one of the younger and brighter whip-
persnappers asks facetiously, “What else?” “N-dimensional
issue spaces? Cycling? Structure-induced equilibria?” I per-
sist. One looks confusedly at another. “Is this guy a his-
torian of political theory?” he asks. The other shrugs. The
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first gazes at me with solicitous, no, clinical concern. “I
think I might still have some stuff on that in my old
textbooks,” he says. “No, don’t bother,” I go on, suddenly
excited by the thought of grabbing their spiffy new mod-
els and bringing them back to the present. Think of the
lustrous new line of prestigious publications on my c.v.!
But the gruesome shade of Karl Popper intercedes. “You
cannot predict scientific innovation,” he cautions me. “If
you could predict it, it would happen now, not later.” Oh
well. I have one last question. “What happened to politi-
cal theory?” I ask plaintively. “Don’t be silly!” one shoots
back. “We are political theory.”
The picture is still vibrantly clear, but I’m suddenly
finding the lebensraum-style audio signal repulsive, so I
throw a black cloth over the crystal ball. A few minutes
later I’ve tuned into CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. These are my kind
of people: they’re immersed in Tocqueville. Better yet,
they’ve learned to shrug off the uneasy sense that political
theorists are always poised precariously between necro-
philia and metaphysics. They don’t have any ghettoization
fantasies about their role in political science: they’ve fig-
ured out that the behaviorists’ battle for an amusingly—or
embarrassingly—crude conception of Science is well and
truly dead, and that it’s fun and interesting to talk to their
colleagues (yes, the modelers too). Some of their col-
leagues even reciprocate.
They’ve also figured out that Tocqueville is not inter-
esting for his own predictions. Yes, he got some right,
perhaps most spectacularly that America and Russia would
emerge as the two great powers (Democracy in America, I,
conclusion). But he produced some unfortunate howlers
too. Islam has not in fact faded from the scene (II.i.5) and
Protestantism seems to be holding its own quite nicely
between Catholicism and atheism (II.i.6). Next decade’s
theorists have noticed that Tocqueville capitalizes on the
Jeane Dixon effect: make enough predictions and some of
them will come true. (Yes, I’m capitalizing on it, too. Or
trying to.) Tocqueville insists that Americans will never
rely on a military draft (I.ii.5) and that democratic soci-
eties will inevitably rely on a military draft (II.iii.23).
Whoops. Tomorrow’s theorists gently laugh off prediction
as a fool’s errand. Nor are they captivated by Tocqueville’s
grandiose historical claims, such as the one about the relent-
less providential march of equality over seven centuries (I,
introduction). They explain that he wanted to jolt the
Catholic ultras out of their maudlin obsession with doom
and gloom by exhibiting the French Revolution as God’s
irreversible will, that’s all.
But they are much pleased by two other facets of
Tocqueville’s work. One is his sustained ambivalence about
equality. God may count the rise of equality as progress,
Tocqueville reports, but he sees it as decay (II.iv.8). This
jittery stance strikes them as far more promising for under-
standing the problems and possibilities of democracy than
any value-neutral stance. And even if they are (little-d)
democrats, as they mostly are, they think it better in
social inquiry to be acerbic than starry-eyed. The other is
Tocqueville’s fascination with finding aristocratic sub-
stance under Jacobin forms, or, as he puts it, the aristo-
cratic colors under the democratic paint (I.i.2). Secondary
associations as estates (II.iv.7), industrial capitalists as aris-
tocrats (II.ii.20), whites as aristocrats (I.ii.10), lawyers as
Egyptian priests, and omnipotent judges chastening the
jury’s belief in democratic competence (I.ii.8): such curi-
ous social formations don’t merely allow Tocqueville to
console the ultras, to assure them that all is not lost; they
also open up a lovely research agenda, exploring the weird,
intricate links between egalitarian and inegalitarian social
dynamics in democratic societies.
So too Tocqueville worries about dangerous transitions.
He explains, for instance, that domestic service works fine
when everyone is reciting from a fully aristocratic script or
a fully democratic one, but that in the move from one to
another, everything is alarming, even dangerous (II.iii.5).
Scrap the inexorable providential march, take seriously the
thought that equality and hierarchy exist side by side—
Tocqueville was wrong about Protestantism, but it’s not as
though the Catholic Church is going away, either; nor have
democratic societies vanquished the social inferiority of
women he congratulates them on maintaining (II.iii.12)—
and you realize that we’re always up against dangerous dis-
sonances, if not dangerous transitions.
I note that these theorists have rejected a priority thesis
Tocqueville regularly flirts with. I mean his thought that
political society will inevitably reflect civil society (II.iii.8.n1;
so too I.i.5, I.i.8, I.ii.5). They notice that at the very least
Tocqueville understands reciprocal causation, or scratch/
itch cycles: if the public turns passively individualist; if their
social horizons shrink; if they succumb in turn to a debased
taste for leveling equality; then they will assign more and
more power to the state, and the benevolently paternalistic
state in turn will control more and more of social life, fur-
thering the people’s mindless absorption in their daily lives.
And since these future theorists are not the least bit pious or
deferential about the canon, they don’t mind adding a
thought, whether or not it’sTocqueville’s: they’re interested
in how politics and policy shape society. Like Tocqueville,
they move readily back and forth between constitutional
structure and apparently trivial episodes in everyday life,
between law and religion, between the weight of tradition
and how history gets written.
In short, these theorists turn toTocqueville not for melo-
dramatic theses about the shape of modernity, not for con-
servative cautions that we must save liberty from the
ubiquitous threat of equality, but for an approach to doing
political theory. To call it a method would be too much:
enough, even better, that it’s a grab-bag of tricks and insights.
Now you may suspect that my crystal ball has mislabeled
the channel, and I’ve really tuned into UTOPIAN OPTIMISM.
Or, then again, NAIVE SELLOUT. Maybe. Time will tell.
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